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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Reconversion is a broad concept.

This is because modern

war affects the total fabric of society.

The intensity with

which social energies are channeled into the war effort may
temporarily obfuscate other social problems but as interna
tional hostilities come to a close these other tension points
return.

As victory in World War II became apparent, the

mechanical problems involved in returning a wartime economy
to a peacetime one became critical.

Since the distribution

of scarce resources was involved, this struggle entailed
sharp ideological conflict and intense interest group partic
ipation.

In Congress, champions for what was known as the

"human side" of reconversion emerged, as did their ideological
counterparts who diligently opposed any sort of legislation
which they believed would further enhance the New Deal welfarestate political philosophy which the thirties had brought.
In Congress, the man who became the leading figure in
reconversion questions on the side of those forces seeking
progressive legislation was Senator James Edward Murray (18761962), a Democrat from Montana.
1

Murray, a Butte attorney,

2

had scored a comfortable victory to a two-year Senate term
in 1934, created by the death of Thomas J. Walsh.

Murray

had been overwhelmingly reelected in 1936 by carrying fiftyfour of Montana's fifty-six counties; then in 1942 had sur
vived a very close contest with Wellington D. Rankin as both
candidates carried twenty-eight counties.^
As reconversion legislation became plentiful, it was
the War Contract Subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs
Committee which handled much of this legislation and in this
way decided what the content of the bills would be when
reported out onto the floor.

Stephen K. Bailey claims that

by April of 1944 this subcommittee, operating under Murray's
chairmanship, controlled every important bill dealing with
reconversion and post-war matters.^

It was from his position

as chairman of this subcommittee, and additional chairmanships
of the Senate Small Business Committee and the Senate Educa
tion and Labor Committee, that Murray gathered much of the
authority with which he influenced reconversion policy.

This

study is an examination of this important role played by
^Who*s Who in America, 1960-61 Volume XXXI (Chicago:
Marquis Publications, i951J. Ellis Waldron, An Atlas of
Montana Politics Since
1864 (Missoula: Montana State Press,
1958), pp. 254-255, 266-267, 298-299.
^Stephen K. Bailey, Congress Makes a Law--The Story
Behind the Employment Act of 1946 (New York: Columbia Univer
sity Press, 1950), p. 33. For information on how Murray's
committee came to monopolize reconversion legislation see
pp. 30-36.
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Murray in order to increase understanding about both Murray's
career, during which he also ardently supported such measures
as the proposed Missouri Valley Authority, the Small Business
Administration Act and compulsory health insurance, and about
the development of reconversion programs in Congress.3
What were the issues which provided the focal points of
World War II reconversion?

The three issues with which Murray

was most intimately involved, and which will provide the topics
for the next three chapters, were war contracts termination,
the disposal of surplus government property, and the question
of federal supplementation of state unemployment compensation
funds.

But there were a plethora of tension points which were

recognized as part of the problem and the inter-connection
between them is apparent.

Murray and other students of recon

version realized that the multitude of questions about the
shape of post-war society were interrelated and that a respon
sible government would be one which addressed itself to as many
of them as possible.

The problem of determining how many of

these issues could be incorporated into a single piece of leg
islation which would be passable in the House and Senate became
a vexatious one for Murray and his staff.
^Thomas Payne, "Montana: Politics under the Copper Dome,"
in Politics in the American West, edited by Frank Jones (Salt
Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1969), p. 219. This thesis
is based primarily upon that section of the Murray Papers sub
titled "War Related Functions and Industries." Located in the
University of Montana Archives, Missoula, Montana, these papers
consist mainly of executive and congressional reports, speeches,
newspaper clippings, and personal correspondence and memoranda.
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In addition to the three areas which will be examined
here, many other facets of the reconversion dilemma can be
listed, including post-war taxation policies; tariff bills;
price control; veteran's benefits; housing and public works;
federal loan policies to business; policy toward labor and
strikes; and rent control.

The war had altered social and

economic relationships and many new policies were developed
from 1943 to 1945 to provide a foundation for post-war
America.
The term "human side" consistently appears in the litera
ture of post-war planning.

As the name suggests it refers to

questions of social justice and economic redistribution.

It

is to be distinguished from policies aimed simply at keeping
the economy functioning at a high tempo.
tinction is, in part, fallacious:

Of course the dis

"keeping the economy going"

is not simply a mechanical process but, like all political
questions, deals with human values.

As far as concrete issues

were concerned, contract termination and surplus property dis
posal were considered mechanical types of problems, and
unemployment compensation and welfare measures were referred
to as involving the "human side."
was a goal supported by all sides.

"Keeping the economy going"
Tracing the progress of

legislation in the next three chapters will indicate how the
"human side" represented the more controversial legislation,
although there were sharp conflicts regarding war contract

5

terminations and surplus property disposal.

The importance

with which Murray viewed the "human side" will also become
clear.
Though statistics regarding the scope of reconversion
vary considerably they do demonstrate the colossal size of
the task which government faced.

In August of 1944 estimates

of surplus property ranged from $50,000,000,000 to
$120,000,000,000.^

One year earlier a projection showed

that with the end of the war the United States might find
itself with as much as $75,000,000,000 worth of undelivered
war contracts,^

Other studies revealed that about half of

the $196,000,000,000 gross national product had its frame
work in war contracts, which showed the pressing need to
develop economic substitutes for those contracts.

As the

end of the war approached, the rate of contract cancellation
increased and the lack of termination policy became more
apparent.^

Murray supposed that V-E day would mean that four

to five million war workers would no longer be needed, that
two million people would be leaving the service, and that the
^U. S., Congress, Senate, Surplus Property Report.
Report No. 1057, 78th Congress, 2d. Sess., 1944.
^"Out From Under," Time (August 30, 1943), pp. 86-87.
[Author unknown.]
6u. S., Congress, Senate, From the Year End Report of
the War Contracts Subcommittee to the Committee on Military
Affairs. Print 2a, 78th Congress, 2d Sess., 1944, p. 1.
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problem would be further compounded following victory over
Japan as five million men would leave the armed services
7

in the first year of demobilization following that victory.
These figures indicate the enormity of the task of recon
version and reconstruction.
Other dimensions of the situation can be brought to
light through comparison with the World War I reconversion
scene.

Recognizing that the task of reconversion would be

much greater than at the end of World War I--undelivered war
contracts, for example, amounted to only $3,600,000,000 at
that time, which was but a tiny fraction of the projected
total for the end of World War II--the goal of Congress was
to establish procedures which would avoid some of the prob
lems which had plagued reconversion efforts following the
earlier war despite the larger magnitude of their task.

Q

Experience, they realized, should be their guide.
In part, the problems would be lesser ones following
V-E and V-J days than they had been in 1918 because conditions
in general were more ordered as World War II was coming to an
end.

This was the case because national war production and

the war economy were in a more advanced state in 1944-1945
than they were in 1918:

At the end of the First World War

''Address by Murray, University of Montana, Archives,
Murray Papers. That Germany would surrender before Japan
was a hypothesis of early reconversion planning.
®"Out From Under," op. cit.
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"blueprints were being drawn up, plants built and initial
inventories ordered."

Q

This less advanced state of affairs

made some aspects of reconversion, particularly the settle
ment of war contracts a more chaotic task than the seventyeighth and seventy-ninth Congresses C1944-1945) were to
face.
In emphasizing that the World War I experience must
not be repeated, Murray noted that, as far as war contracts
were concerned, at the time of World War II unsettled claims
still remained from World War I!^^

In regard to surplus

property disposal a report of Murray's Small Business Committee
suggested that effective coordination was lacking when the May,
1918 law concerning this problem was established centering the
power of administration in the executive.

This lack of coord

ination resulted in a situation in which "one government
agency was not infrequently disposing of a surplus another
was ordering."^^

Murray also stated, in arguing for the

Contract Settlement Act, that it would provide a comprehensive
approach and avoid the confusion which resulted from the World
War I mistake of having government agencies "act on disposal
^J. A. Livingstone, Reconversion-The Job Ahead, Public
Affairs Pamphlet No. 94, Public Attairs Committee, r944,
p. 15.
^^Address by Murray, undated, Murray Papers.
Hu. S. Congress, Preliminary Report of Surplus War
Property Subcommittee of Special Committee to Study Problems
of American Small Business. 78th Congress, 2d sess., July 21,
1944 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1944).
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industry by industry." 1 7

It also needs pointing out that

the two wars differed in that World War I saw almost no
government ownership of plants.

In World War II government

had become the largest industrial owner creating disposal
problems which had not existed before.13 At any rate Murray
and others were able to approach the situation with some
degree of historical insight which was to aid them in their
task.
One of the reasons why Murray engaged so vigorously in
reconversion planning was his fear that the end of the war
would mean the recrudesence of the depression which had
marred the thirties.

Murray was one of those who believed

that an active federal government could promote the kind of
policies which would prevent the disastrous effects that
another depression would bring.

He said, "American business

realizes that another depression such as we experienced in the
1930's might well mean the end of capitalism in America.
For Murray an ideal reconversion would mean an economy that
did not falter with the coming of peace, but rather maintained
a high level of production; and a society which would provide
special benefit to those individuals whose circumstances were
disrupted in the transition.
17
•^^U.
S. Senate, Surplus Property Report. Colonel John
son and Murray for Small Business Committee, 78th Congress,
2d sess.. Report No. 1057, August 22, 1944.
13ibid.
l^Speech by Murray, undated, Murray Papers.
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The question, of course, was what sort of policies
would build economic prosperity and promote social justice?
The question brought deep ideological division.

In part, it

was a battle of the new Keynesian-influenced economics versus
certain older conceptions of American capitalism with their
lesser degree of federal manipulation.
omies were also present:

Other familiar dichot

labor and small business vs. big

business; and federal action vs. states' "rights."

Murray

and other liberal colleagues consistently defended the firstmentioned element of each of these dichotomies.

Many of the

arguments were framed in terms of priorities--for example, if
congressional legislation had permitted big business to make
exceptional wartime profit and advanced money to corporations
during the period in which their contracts were being termi
nated, should government not also undertake increased respon
sibility toward workers?
and more pragmatic:

Other questions were less ideological

At what point is it safe to begin certain

demobilization and reconversion programs without hindering the
war effort?

How fast can war contracts be terminated and sur

plus property be disposed of without harming the government's
ability to protect itself against waste and swindle (economic
efficiency vs. security)?

These last two questions represented

a balancing of non-controversial and universally recognized
interest more than any fierce ideological differing.

10

Although Murray became the most important congressional
figure in the area o£ reconversion legislation, there were a
multitude of other governmental figures who worked on the
problems.

Two other senators who played significant roles

were Walter F, George CDemocrat-Georgia), the chairman of
the Senate Committee on Post-War Economic Policy and Planning
and chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, and Harley M.
Kilgore (Democrat-West Virginia), the chairman of the War
Mobilization Subcommittee of the Military Affairs Committee,
The House had also designated certain committees to work on
post-war problems.

According to Bailey, Senators Murray,

Kilgore and George and their respective staffs '*spent most
of late 1943 and early 1944 jockeying for position in the
race to dominate reconversion legislation," a race which,
as was noted earlier, the Murray forces won.^^

Although

the senators tended to engage publicly in the traditional
senatorial rhetoric of mutual admiration. Bailey wrote that
there was considerable discord between them caused by both
jealousy and different conceptions of proper policy.
The special Senate and House committees together with
the Baruch-Hancock Report provided the framework and impetus
l^Bailey, p. 30.
16Murray, as is traditional, was effusive in his praise
of his fellow senators. He referred to the preparation of
the War Contract Settlement Act as a "perfect example of
teamwork between committees,'* Murray Papers,

11

for the reconversion legislation passed by Congress.

The

Baruch team was working, at the direction of the executive
branch, on solving the same reconversion problems that the
/

special committees were involved with in Congress.

James F.

Byrnes, the head of the Office of War Mobilization, had re
quested Bernard Baruch to undertake a study of reconversion
and Baruch had, in turn, asked New York industrial banker
John M. Hancock to assist him. Their report became public
on February 15, 1944,17 Although the ideas of the congres
sional committees and those of the Baruch-Hancock Report are
quite similar there was a certain degree of animosity, appar
ently precipated by jealousy, between the congressional study
groups and the Baruch-Hancock people.

CMurray was probably

much less disturbed by Baruch and Hancock than were certain
other congressmen, particularly Mr. George.)^®

Since the

work of the executive branch and congressional committees
were concurrent and contained similar formulas for solving
post-war ills, it is difficult to judge either source to be
the one which made the most significant contribution.

It is

true, however, that the ultimate scope and direction of recon
version were to be determined by vote of Congress.

l^Bernard Baruch and John M. Hancock, Report on War
and Po.cit War Adjustment Policies CWashington, IJ.(J.: D"I ST
Government Printing Office, 1944),
^®Bailey, p. 32,
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Some of the administrative arrangements which were
developed in planning for peace were highly original.

The

legislation developed in the Murray subcommittee represented
some of the most significant change--^especially the tendency
for Congress to itself direct the functioning of certain
organs which it had created in place of the traditional
arrangement whereby such administrative bodies occupied a
staff relation with the President and functioned at the direc
tion of the executive.^®

The question of the proper balance

between congressional and executive power was one of deep con
cern to Murray who thought that action must be taken "to
restore to Congress a large amount of the control which during
the war the Congress delegated to the administrative branch of
government."^®

Murray was convinced that Congress would be

failing the people if it did not stay informed of the activities
and policies of executive departments.

In Chapter 2 it will be

shown how this idea of an energetic and active Congress inspired
Murray to incorporate into the War Contract Settlement Act
^®See V. 0. Key, Jr., "The Reconversion Phase of Demo
bilization," American Political Science Review. XXXVIII, No.
6 (December, 1944), pp. 1137-1153. (Hereinafter referred to
as "Reconversion Phase").
^^Speech by Murray, undated, Murray Papers. During the
war years many fundamental decisions were made by the execu
tive branch and passed with little questioning or contribu
tion by Congress. These decisions included the War Powers
Act, Selective Service Act, Emergency Price Control Act, and
sundry war appropriations. See Betram M. Gross, "The Role
of Congress in Contract Termination," Law and Contemporary
Problems (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, iy44j, p. 540.
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provisions which activally provided for Congressional sur
veillance an4 knowledge of executive activity.

He viewed

this development as "an interesting experiment in view of
the traditional attempts to keep our government divided into
three water-tight compartments."^l
The perspectives from which Murray viewed reconversion
policy will be of recurrent interest in this theses.

Murray

saw it as very important for the vitality of a democratic
government that Congress, rather than the executive, take the
initiative in developing programs.

Secondly, in Murray*s

judgment the most powerful opponent which the progressive
forces faced were the big industrial concerns.?7 He consis
tently sought policies which would provide increased benefit
to the interests of labor and of the small businessman.

Big

business, he believed, was more than able to take care of its
own interests.

"Business enterprise," he stated, should never

"profit at the cost of human misery.
What is probably Murray's most interesting piece of
legislation--the Employment Act of 1946--will be mentioned
only in passing for two reasons:

It has been extensively

dealt with by Stephen Bailey in Congress Makes a Law; and
it is a broader type of legislation than this study is
^^Speech by Murray, undated, Murray Papers.
22Washington Post, July 7, 1944.
23press Release, June 4, 1951, Murray Papers.
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concerned with.

Although, it is clear that the reconversion

legislation o£ the War Contracts Subcommittee had farreaching social implications, the Employment Act of 1946
was a different sort of a bill in that it was intended to
establish a "permanent federal obligation, far transcending
the limited reconversion concepts.

Murray felt that the

reconversion legislation which Congress passed was inadequate
in terms of its ability to cope with the more far-reaching
problems of American society.

More legislation, like the

Employment Act of 1946, which was initially intended to
establish federal responsibility for seeing that every ablebodied American had a job, was needed to supplement the trend
toward increased social justice that Murray felt post-war
legislation would bring.The Employment Act of 1946 repre
sents a continuation of the same type of ideological goals
which guided his earlier reconversion work.

Murray sought to

increase the scope of activity of the federal government in
ways which he thought would better society.
^^Bailey, p. 32. The extent of Murray's concern about
big business influence upon national reconversion policy
leads one to ask questions about his relationship to tradi
tional corporate interests in Montana. Since Montana is
viewed as a state where a few corporations such as Anaconda
and Montana Power exercise an inordinate amount of political
power, it would be of interest to explore Murray's role in
helping or hindering these industrial monoliths in the con
text of reconversion. Unfortunately, that investigation was
not undertaken in this thesis due to the lack of information
on such matters in the ''Murray Papers."
^^Bailey, p. 54.
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The next three chapters o£ this study deal with those
three areas of reconversion with which Murray was most con
cerned, and with the legislation he favored towards ame
liorating those problem areas.

In looking at war contract

termination, surplus property disposal and federal supple
mentation of unemployment compensation it seems that pressures
from his Montana constituency had little effect on Murray's
actions.

Although there may have been considerable concern

about economic conditions in general on the part of Montana
groups, there seems to have been little awareness of, or
agitation for, any particular policies such as Murray was
interested in.

On the whole Murray's relationship with

Montanans in regard to reconversion seems to have centered
around special favors he could do for particular communities
or individuals.

Murray's personal papers indicate that Mon

tana people were more concerned with topical issues such as
temperance on military bases and treatment of JapaneseAmericans in detention camps.

It is possible, however, to

isolate two factors which caused Murray to become so involved
in these questions;

The particular position which he held in

the committee structure as chairman of the Special Senate
Committee on Problems of Small Business since 1940 and chair
man of the War Contracts Subcommittee of the Committee on
Military Affairs put him in a position to be a leader on

16

these issues.The second significant factor seems to have
been his own particular political animus--as a solid propo
nent of the New Deal, Murray tried to extend these same
principles into post-war society.

His fear of the recurrence

of depression and his qualms about the post-war economy in
general are reflected in his concern for a smooth change-over
from war to peace.

^^Who^^s Who in United States Politics and American
Political Almanac (^Chicago: Capitol House, 1952J.

CHAPTER II
WAR CONTRACT TERMINATION
In September of 1943 a War Contracts Subcommittee of
the Senate Military Affairs Committee was established to
consider contract settlement legislation.

The three original

members of the subcommittee were Chairman Murray, Harry S.
Truman (Democrat^Missouri) and Chapman Revercomb (RepublicanWest Virginia).

Providing important assistance to the com

mittee were two staff members:

Bertram M. Gross, the direc

tor, and Kurt Borchardt, consultant.

Murray's son, Charles,

was appointed executive-secretary,
At the same time the Post-War Planning Committee under
the guidance of Senator George CDemocrat-Georgia) was also
working in the area of contract settlement.

Since the two

committees were at work on the same problems Murray invited
George to be co-sponsor of the Contract Settlement Bill which
the Murray committee was formulating.

George accepted and the

Murray-George omnibus contract settlement bill (Public Law 395)
1

came to the floor of the Senate on February 11, 1944.

The

original goal had been to pass an omnibus bill covering all
^Bailey, pp. 30-36,
17
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phases of reconversion; however, since such a bill was bound
to contain many controversial provisions, including some
dealing with unemployment compensation, getting it through
Congress meant considerable delay or, quite possibly, failure.
So the committee decided to focus its efforts on the passage
of the Murray-George Bill,^

Although certain liberal ele

ments were upset at the Murray Committee when it did not
include any measures to rectify inadequacies in the unemploy
ment compensation system, the committee's decision is more
understandable when it is realized that the members had
I
labored for eight months on contract termination legislation and had no desire to see their efforts go for nothing.

T

The Murray-George Bill, providing the basis for the
entire program of post-war contract termination was signed
into law July 1, 1944 and was incorporated into the Office
of War Management and Reconversion.^

Although Murray felt

that the passage of a sound contract termination bill was
"probably" not the most important piece of legislation
^War Contract Terminations and Settlements. A Historical
Record Including the Activities of Contract Settlement in
World War II. p. 49-50, Murray Papers. (Hereinafter referred
to as Terminations and Settlements.*) The author of this manu
script was not mentioned in the work. The report seems to
have been prepared by some government agency, perhaps the
Office of Contract Settlement itself. Murray thought the
history accurate and that its only weaknesses were that it
did not emphasize the important role of Congress enough.
^Bailey, pp. 33-34.
^58 Statute 649, July 1, 1944.
58 Statute 785, October 3, 1944.
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needed to convert the economy from wartime prosperity to
peacetime prosperity, he did recognize a termination program
as the "first essential step toward reconversion."

Murray

realized that a "serious situation" had been created by the
termination of fourteen billion dollars worth of contracts
by May of 1944 without the guidance of a sound program.
Murray felt that the inefficiency of the system then in use
was pointed up by the circumstance of some contracts having
been "settled" for a year without contractors having secured
payments.^
Prior to the Contract Settlement Act settlements were,
for the most part, handled by the various agencies on an
individual basis as incidental matters to procurement.

As

the volume of terminations increased it became apparent that
a better procedure was needed.

Among other things unfavor

able criticism was heard regarding inadequate procedures for
appeal:

war contractors, trade associations and governmental

committees thought that established appeal boards would be
helpful in answering complaints.^
In 1943, in response to the increasing need for estab
lished government policies and standards, the Director of
War Mobilization appointed a joint contract termination board
to tackle the problem.

On January 8, 1944 the Director

^Speech by Murray on Reconversion, undated, Murray Papers,
^Terminations and Settlements, p. 148,

20

announced that a "uniform termination article for fixedprice supply contracts" was to go into effect at the suggestion of the board.

n

This clause was to be used by the

various agencies in negotiating contracts and, so far as
was feasible, was to be implemented into already existing
contracts.

V. 0. Key, Jr. interpreted the clause as having

"defined the rights and duties of the contractor on receipt
of a termination notice, adapted the principle that settle
ments should be made by negotiation and established principles
to be followed in determining amounts due as an alternative
to argued settlement."®
Also, in 1943 the War Department had requested enact'
ment of a rider to an Army appropriations bill which would
have given the Secretary of War complete authority to use
departmental appropriations "in connection with the termina
tion of War Department Contracts, under such regulation as
he may prescribe and without regard to any provision of law
^James Murray, "Contract Settlement Act of 1944," Murray
Papers. This article originally appeared in the journal of
Law and Contemporary Problems, op. cit. The basic concepts
behind the two main types of World War II contracts are sug
gested by their names--fixed price being an initial settle
ment establishing the entire cost of the goods and services
which will be paid by the government; and the cost-plusfixed-fee contract being an agreement in which the govern
ment will pay the cost of the goods and services agreed upon
plus a designated "reasonable profit," It was this latter
type of contract which many, including Murray, thought had
encouraged waste and corruption.
®Key, "Reconversion Phase," p. 1145.
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relating to making, performance, amendment, or modification
9
of contracts. , .
To Murray's mind this request was a
blatant example of the efforts of the Army and executive
to usurp the rightful powers of Congress.

It was Murray's

firm belief that on matters as important as contract term
ination policy Congress must be the guiding force.

Murray

thought it much to the credit of Congress that instead of
mechanically passing the rider it began an investigation
into the implications of such a request.
At the same time Murray's Senate Small Business Committee
began to receive complaints from small businessmen regarding
termination problems which created further momentxim toward a
Congressional attack on the inadequacies of the existing
program.^®

In general there was considerable uneasiness

among the business community regarding the lack of clarity
in government policy and procedure.

It was reported that

some contractors had opted against war production and had
chosen civilian production solely because they feared "redtape" on the termination date.^^

The result of this lack

of an effective and recognized policy had far-reaching dan
gers in addition to upsetting the business world:

it was

threatening the war effort and the economy as a whole.
^James Murray, "Contract Settlement Act of 1944,"
Murray Papers.
lOlbid.. p. 683.
^^New York Times, March 20, 1944.

It
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was into the center of this problem that Murray insisted
Congress had a responsibility to proceed.
Since the War Contract Subcommittee was seeking a
broad legislative solution to the whole problem of termina
tion the response of that committee to the executive's
"uniform termination article" was entirely predictable,
and one with which armed services administrators tended
19
to concur.
A Subcommittee report termed the clause
"welcome" but not a "complete answer" and went on to
suggest what was really required:
The scope of the uniform termination clause is
quite modest. It offers no approach to problems
of subcontractors. It does not deal with costplus-fixed-fee contracts. It does not clarify
the role of the general accounting office. It
does not establish a suitable program for advance
notice, removal of materials from plant, or for
interim financing. It does not attempt to deal
with appeals; the handling of informal, defective
or quasi-contracts; the type of records that
should be kept; the development of appropriate
statistics on contract termination; the detec
tion and prosecution of fraud; and many other
items.
More will be said about the above listed inadequacies
later, but it might be well to enumerate some general prin
ciples which Murray felt a well constructed piece of contract
termination legislation should include,

Murray gathered

^^Colonel David Hauseman who headed the Army's readjust
ment division in charge of settling contracts believed that
the job of termination would be much better handled with
legislation such as the pending Murray-George Bill, Time,
April 17, 1944,
^^New York Times, March 20, 1944,
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ideas for these principles from many sources--the diverse
Congressional committees who worked on the problem; the
sizable staffs of those committees; the executive branch
in the Bari|ch-Hancock Report; numerous interest groups
including the military, business organizatons, labor, and
agriculture; and interested citizens who contributed advice
and suggestions to their governmental representatives upon
request of the committees or through their own initiative.
The legislation which Congressmen like Murray authored and
sponsored depended on all these sources for ideas.
Murray believed that legislation for contract settle
ment should impose upon the government and its executive
the following responsibilities:

quick settlements, with

interim financing between termination and final settlement
Cwhen properly structured and administered this would,
presumably, prevent widespread bankruptcy); protection of
the small businessman; protection of the government's
interests in preventing overpayments, recovering excess
payments and preventing fraudreemployment through quick,
fair and efficient settlement which would create civilian
^^See the chapter on reconversion in Harold Stein,
Public Administration and Public Policy CNew York: Harcourt
Brace and Company, 1952}, pp. 215-285, Although the Contract
Settlement Act provided the basis of the termination program
when it became law on July 1, 1944 much of the groundwork of
the coming burden of settlements had Been laid by the admin
istrators in the executive departments.
ISfjotes for a speech on the War Contract Settlement Act,
undated, Murray Papers.
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jobs; and provision for the speedy removal of plant inven
tories to encourage prompt resumption of civilian activi
ties.^^

These five principles were central to Murray and

his associates when they wrote the Contract Settlement Act.
The contract settlement question proved to be a less
controversial issue than some others.

Senator Vandenburg

(Republican-Michigan) commented two months before passage
that "In my view there has ceased to be any substantial
controversy in respect to contract termination and plant
clearance as contemplated in S. 1718."^^

Although Vandenburg

felt that by May controversy had ceased, there had been a
number of sharp points of disagreement during the formulation
of the bill in committee and on the floor.

What were these

points of controversy?
First, there was the question of when businesses should
be allowed to return to civilian production.

Many people

felt that it would be unfair to permit corporations to engage
in civilian production in certain areas when their chief
competitors were still engaged in war production.

This posi

tion was, of course, taken by those industries still engaged
in war production who saw their business competitors either
resuming or indicating that they would soon resume civilian
l^Gross, "The Role of Congress in Contract Termination,"
p. 542.
^^Quoted in U. S., Congress, Senate. Military Affairs
Committee Print on Termination of War Contracts, 78th Congress, 1944.
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production.

Even worse, they argued, would be the permitting

of new competitors to enter the market and take away their
TO
business while they were serving the nation.
At the other extreme there were those who suggested a
policy of deliberately removing small businesses from war
production first, in order to give them a head start in
post-war civilian production.19 Murray*s position was not
this extreme, but was a laissez-faire attitude which advo
cated allowing businesses to return to civilian production
as their war work was completed.

The issue proved the most

volatile in the development of the Contract Settlement Act
and was the issue on which Murray said the big industrial
interests most vehemently opposed him.^®
Secondly, questions arose as to the proper role for the
Offices of Comptroller General and Attorney General in the
new legislation.

When the Congress first undertook consid

eration of termination legislation in October of 1943 Comp
troller General Lindsay Warren informed the appropriate
congressional committees that he would be opposed to allow
ing any procurement agencies to negotiate a final settlement
S., Congress, Senate, Building the Post-War Econ
omy. From the Year-End Report of the War Contract Subcommittee to the Committee on Military Affairs pursuant to Senate
Resolution 198, 78th Congress, 2nd Sess., Senate Subcommit
tee Print 12a, December 18, 1944.
^^Key, "Reconversion Phase,** p, 1141.
^^Washington Post. July 7, 1944,
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until his office had examined and approved the terms of such
a settlement.

Warren made it clear that he felt such a

policy would not only fail to safeguard the financial inter
ests of the nation, but would also be illegal.

He said he

deplored:
a growing tendency on the part of some adminis
trative agencies ... to vest in contracting
offices or their representatives final authority
to adjust and settle claims against the United
States in degradation of the authority and
jurisdiction vested in the General Accounting
Office by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,
21 U.S.C. 41.21
Those who were opposed to giving the Comptroller General
the authority and responsibility that Warren thought proper
argued that since settlements were to be made by negotiation,
and not through the application of accounting principles,
such a mandatory review would only mean "a re-negotiation
of a negotiated settlement."

In suggesting a much more

limited role for the Comptroller General they feared that
compulsory review would serve to slow down the settlement
process and, thus, promote unemployment. 2 2
The third key area of dispute involved questions of
oversight and responsibility:

where and how to place the

proper balance between the powers of the executive and the
legislative branches,

Murray's committee was quite clear

2^Terminations and Settlements, p. 45.
^^Key, "Reconversion Phase," pp. 1147-1148.
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about its desire to increase congressional participation;
Many government officials prefer legislation
that deals only with organization and neglects
the declaration of congressional policies.
Rather than have the Congress clearly define
their responsibilities they prefer to operate
under the incomplete legislation that would
leave them full powers of direction in formu
lating basic policies, your subcommittee feels
that this approach is not acceptable to the
Congress.23
It was Murray's deep conviction that Congress must exercise
its reponsibility of "determining programs and outlining
policies to be followed by the executive agencies in matters
such as demobilization and post-war adjustment.Although
the subcommittee recognized that under the War Powers Act
the executive was authorized to exercise many powers which
ordinarily would require Congressional authorization they
believed that through strong congressional planning the
country could best be prepared for the return to normal
congressional policy-making power and the expiration of
the emergency powers of the executive.
In other words, Murray's position was that it would be
a healthy thing for the democracy if Congress took a strong
hand in the development of reconversion legislation, since
it would eventually assume much of the power which in time
of war had been taken over by the executive.
2

Even though

Memo of Murray, September, 1943, Murray Papers.

S., Congress, Senate, Demob11ization and Post-War
Adjustment Legislation. Report to the Committee on Military
Affairs CWashington, D.C,: Government Printing Office, 1944).
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the war was not over he felt that war contract termination
was the type of thing Congress could assert itself on
without harming the national interest.

However, some came

to view the War Contract Settlement Act as establishing a
type of congressional power never seen before in the United
States and, thus, as an effort to extend the powers of the
Congress far beyond their traditional position in the balance
of power with the executive.
There was ;;eneral agreement that Congress should estab
lish policy in regards to contract termination but the pro
visions which called for continued congressional surveil
lance to insure that the administrative agencies actually
performed these policies were questioned,Never before
had legislation called for "continuous surveillance" and
some heads of executive agencies feared that such a pro
vision would lead to intolerable and disruptive meddling
in their affairs.
The final version of the Contract Settlement Act indi
cated that the positions favored by Murray prevailed on
the three controversial issues outlined above.

The decision

was made to allow businesses to return to civilian production
irrespective of alleged competitive advantage.

The roles of

the Comptroller General and Attorney General were less than

^^War Contract Settlement Act. Section 2 (a* b), Public
Law 395, July 1, 1944.
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officials would have preferred,And provisions calling
for congressional oversight were instituted.
Actually the decision to allow corporations to return
to civilian production irrespective of competitive advan
tage represented a continuation of executive policy.

In

June of 1944 the chairman of the War Production Board had
ruled that contractors could return to civilian production,
if in so doing they would not harm the war effort, irrespec
tive of whether or not their competitors were still tied up
with war contracts.

The chairman also decided that new

firms would be able to enter an industry despite the fact
that firms who had been engaged in that particular line of
production may not yet have reconverted.? fi

So these impor

tant points were already government reconversion policy
prior to the passage of the Contract Settlement Act.

They

provided part of the foundation upon which Murray worked,
and part of the already existing policy which the Act did
nothing to alter.
Given Murray^s general orientation toward reconversion
and the economy two reasons why such a policy would have
appealed to him can be discerned.

It would tend to promote

^^Ibid., Section 16.
^^Ibid., Section 2, The word "oversight" is used here
to mean "management" or "supervision,"
2®Key, "Reconversion Phase," p. 1142.
War Production Board release No, 5946,

Key cites a
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general economic prosperity and employment,

A War Contract

Subcommittee report stated that, "If the gross national
product is high enough after the var-^in other words if
there is enough productive economic activity--then there
OQ
will be jobs for everyone."
Since Murray wanted such
high post-war production he would also encourage a speedy
return to civilian production to further this goal.

It

may also be inferred that since Murray feared an increased
control of economic life by giant monopolies following the
end of the war he would favor a policy of encouraging new
industries to enter certain areas of civilian production
7n
in order to promote a more competitive economic milieu.*^"
The role of the Comptroller General was not controver
sial in an ideological sense, or because it aroused the
attention of interest groups.

It became an issue because

it raised questions of the government's protecting itself
against possible fraud caused by rapid return of corpora
tions to civilian production.

The chances of fraud perhaps

were increased, but the speed of settlement also increased
when the Contract Settlement Act, instead of allowing the
Comptroller General to review each and every settlement,
S,, Congress, Senate, Building the Post-War Econ
omy. From the Year-End Report of the War Contracts Sub~
committee on Military Affairs pursuant to Senate Resolution
198, 78th Congress, 2nd Sess., Senate Subcommittee Print
12a, December 18, 1944.
^^Memorandum, January 5, 1944, Murray Papers.
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directed .that office to investigate selected settlements
to determine if they were Being made in accordance with
T1
the principles of the act, and whether there was fraud.
This way the responsibility for settling contracts was
delegated to the contracting agencies as was required
given the tremendous volume of contracts that had to be
settled.

That a very limited amount of litigation developed

out of the settlement of war contracts indicates that the
law was not a cause of scandal and irresponsibility as some
had feared.
Section II of the act provided for congressional over
sight of the administration of the program which Murray
thought unprecedented.

Congress delegated the responsi

bility of appraising the reports of the Director of Contract
Settlement

position established by the act) and the

Comptroller General to appropriate committees in the Senate
and House.

Murray thought that Congress would not meet

its full responsibility just by passing the needed legisla
tion and approving the President's choice for Director.
Follow-through was also important and for Murray this meant
the added responsibility of seeing that the policies spec
ified in the law were actually carried out by the executive
^^Key, "Reconversion Phase," p. 1147. Also War Contract
Settlement Act. Section 16, Public Law 395, July 1, 1944.
32Murray, "Contract Settlement Act of 1944."

^^vfar Contract Settlement Act, Section 4 (a), Public Law
395, July 1, 1944.
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apparatus, and that amendments be passed should the need
for such changes become clear through congressional scru
tiny,
Murray believed that this type of continued congres
sional oversight of the executive's administration of
%

legislation was destined to play a very important part in
the functioning of American government.

As society and

government becamie more complicated he realized that it
would also become increasingly necessary for Congress to
confine its role to establishing basic policy guidelines
for others to apply to concrete circumstances.

In Murray's

opinion a surveillance policy such as the one established
in the Contract Settlement Act provided an approach which
would insure that Congress maintained its law-making
responsibility while also permitting the executive branch
the necessary degree of authority and discretion to carry
forth the policies effectively-^^

This system represented

a pointedly different approach from the usual administrative
doctrine which placed an office such as Director of Con
tract Settlement in a staff relation with the President;
the effect was to allow Congress to exercise many of the
powers which had typically belonged to the President.

That

this type of legislation would serve to lessen the power of
34Murray, "Contract Settlement Act of 1944."
35lb id.
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the Chief Executive is clear although the President did
retain that very important right to appoint the department
head.
The Contract Settlement Act contained special pro
visions designed to benefit and protect sub-contractors.
Sub-contractors were frequently small businessmen and,
since Murray was chairman of the Senate Small Business
Committee, it was to be expected that he would show partic
ular concern toward their situation.

Sub-contracting, due

to technological development, played a much greater part in
World War II war production than it had in World War I.^^
In fact, one syndicated newspaper columnist argued that the
reason why 72 per cent of all war orders were in the hands
of one hundred companies was due to extensive sub-contracting
*T n

and sub-sub-contracting.*''
Murray provided protection for the sub-contractor by
implementing "quick, fair settlement, speedy removal of
materials from war plants and proper advance notice."^®

Only

through a broad legislative approach did he foresee these
goals being achieved.

Murray viewed the termination clauses

in existence while he was working on the Contract Settlement
Act as conflicting and incomplete, and as providing little
^^Terminations and Se111ements.
Drew Pearson, "Washington Merry-Go-Round," in various
newspapers of Sundays, June 12, 1944.
^®Statement of Murray, undated, Murray Papers.
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or no claim against the prime contractor."^®
As part of the speed-up process the act utilized an
approach, also recommended by the Baruch-Hancock Report
which placed responsibility for reaching settlements on
prime contracts with the government contracting agency.^®
The "vertical system'* of settlement, the suggested mode of
negotiation, meant that the prime contractor was to nego
tiate settlements with his own sub-contractors.

This system

would function when the prime and sub-contractor were able
to concur on an acceptable settlement; this tentative agree
ment would then be submitted to a government contracting
officer, and, meeting his approval, would be an official
cost which the government would pay to the prime contractor
in order for him to settle with the sub-contractor.

This

method was accepted largely because the upper-tier contrac
tor had much more knowledge of the whole settlement process
than did lower-tier contractors, many of whom were totally
unfamiliar with its machinations.^^
The war-time bureaucracy, seeking to protect sub
contractors yet realizing the impracticality of a review
of all sub-contract settlements, developed a pattern of
checks which provided some efficiency of review and, more
^^Washington Post, "Murray Asks Control Agency in
Contracts," December 8, 1943.
^QWar Contract Settlement Act, Section 6 C^), Public
Law 395, July 1, 1944.
^^Ibid.. Section 7 (a).
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important, required prime contractors to maintain adequate
personnel and procedures to do most o£ the work of reviewAo
ing themselves.
The War Contract Settlement Act continued this basic
t

policy of requiring prime war contractors to handle the
claims of their own lower-tier sub-contractors in order to
cut down on "red-tape" and to increase the speed of the
process.

However, a significant deviation from this policy-

appeared in Section 7 Ca) of the new legislation;

sub

contractors were allowed to settle their claims directly
with the contracting agency if that agency "deems such
action necessary or desirable for the expeditious and
equitable settlement of such claims."

This policy was

designed to protect sub-contractors against prime con
tractors who had either "gone broke" or refused to pay
for other reasons.

That sub-contractors seldom requested

to settle with the government's contracting agency rather
than their prime contractors indicates that from their
perspective the vertical system was functioning with some
degree of success.
Other sections of the act directed the Smaller War
Plants Corporation iof which Murray was the founding father)
to provide these businesses with information in regard to
J

^^Terminations and Settlements, p. 102,
^^Ibld.. p, 115.
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interim financing, settlements, and removal and storage of
termination inventories.^^

The Director of the Office of

War Contract Settlement was required to collaborate with
the Smaller War Plants Corporation to fulfill these objec
tives.
These policies, designed to protect smaller businesses,
reflected Murray*s concern with their particular problems.
His attitude was that the big companies could take care of
themselves but that the smaller firms needed special assis
tance which could be provided directly through government
agencies or by requiring the big companies to provide aid
to their weaker associates.

Since the smaller firms did

not possess the legal resources, accounting staff or finan
cial resources of the larger corporations, Murray recog
nized that they would be the ones to suffer first and most
if Congress failed to produce a fair and effective termina
tion program.
One other section of the War Contract Settlement Act
merits mention because of the contribution it made toward
increasing economic activity--the sixty day plant clearance
policy.This allowed the contractor to ask the govern
ment procurement agency to move contract inventory out of
44p,M. (New York City), January 14, 1944.
^5war Contract Settlement Act, Section 20 Cg) and
21 Cb), Public Law 395, July 1, 1944.
11,id., Section 12.

37

the plant; and if the government did not perform this func
tion within the sixty-day limitation the contractor was
allowed to provide for the storage of equipment at govern
ment expense.

This policy was also proposed in the Baruch-

Hancock Report and was a provision Murray undoubtedly
favored because, combined with interim financing, it would
allow plants to adapt to peace production more rapidly, and
thus contribute to maintaining a high gross national product
and a low unemployment rate.^^
Although important new processes were added to the con
tract termination programs in the spring of 1945, they
merely helped expedite and did not alter the basic policies
of the Murray committee*s War Contract Settlement Act,

The

legislation filled the need for a broad, effective approach
to the confusion of termination.

Since the Baruch-Hancock

Report recommended so many of the same policies which
appeared in the War Contract Settlement Act it is evident
that if the executive branch had continued to establish
policy in the areas of contract termination its approach
would not have been radically different from that of Con
gress, and it would have been implemented sooner (the War
Congract Settlement Act was not passed until over five
months after the Baruch-^Hancock Report was made public).
^^Baruch and Hancock, Report oh War and Post-War
Adiustmeht Policies, p. 13.
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Yet to supporters of a strong Congress like Murray it would
have been inimical to the nation in the long run if Congress
did not assert itself as the law-making body which the
Constitution intended it to be and set policy in such an
important sphere as reconversion policy.

Those policies

which appeared in the War Contract Settlement Act (and in
the Baruch-Hancock Report) that were designed to aid the
small businessman were, in part, a reflection of the increas
ing fear of big business dominance.^®

Murray's view was

that this dominance had been accelerated during the war as
many new facilities had been constructed at government ex
pense and then turned over to large corporations to operate.^®
His opinion was that government had done enough to aid big
business and should now turn its attention to assisting those
less prosperous members of the business community.

Murray

was convinced that those who opposed his termination policies
were representing the "big industrial interests."^®

However,

this opposition seems to have been somewhat limited--the
legislation was recognized as an essential program, and after
early quarrels, came to be regarded as a relatively uncontroversial piece of legislation.

The ease with which it

carried the day in both the House and Senate, and the fact
^^Ibid.. p. 38,
^^Speech by Murray, undated, Murray Papers.
^^Washington Post. July 7, 1944,
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that it enjoyed strong e:xecutive support, speak to its high
popularity.
For James E, Murray contract termination was only the
beginning.

He saw reconversion as a number of related

problems and it was toward the solution of other problems
that he continued to devote his energy.

^^Donald H. Riddle, The Truman Committee. A Study in
Congressional Responsibility. CNew Brunswick: N.J.: Rutgers
University Press, 1964), p. 160. "[The] long advocacy of
spreading contracts geographically and among small pro
ducers . . . had the support of virtually all Congressmen."
F.D.R. approved the bill on July 1, 1944. VicePresident Truman was one of the original members of the
War Contracts Subcommittee and helped to formulate the bill.
Christian Science Monitor, July 10, 1944.
Murray claimed the Act passed the Senate unanimously.
Address by Murray, xindated, Murray Papers.

CHAPTER III
SURPLUS PROPERTY DISPOSAL
Murray believed that the establishment of a war con
tract settlement policy necessitated a companion bill on
the question of surplus property disposal,^

Murray was

actively involved in this area as a member of the Surplus
Property Subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee and of the Small Business Committee,

2

The policies

which he stood for in regard to surplus property disposal
closely paralleled his stand on war contract termination.
In addition to examining some of these policies as they
relate to the Surplus Property Bill this chapter will
also touch upon the relationship between war surplus.
Senator Murray, and his Montana constituency.
The "Surplus Property Act of 1944" superceded Executive
Order 9425 which had established a Surplus War Property Admin
istration under a single head.

The new law established a

three-man Surplus Property Board which was to be appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
^Memo, undated, Murray Papers.
2u, S., Congress, Senate,^ "Surplus Property Report.
Report No, 1057, 78th Congress, 2nd Sess., August, 1944.
Letter from Murray to E, J, Hornick, Associate Director of
Community .Chest, Washington, D.C,, April 10, 1946, Murray Papers,
40
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This board was to function, like the Director of Contract
Settlement, under the general supervision of the Office of
A
War Management and Reconversion, It possessed the power to
designate agencies for the disposal of surplus property.^
Like the War Contract Settlement Act the Surplus Prop
erty Disposal Act was directed toward promoting a smooth and
rapid industrial transition to peacetime.

It established

machinery and procedures for the government to follow in
expediting the disposal of surplus war property; and it
established ground rules to be followed by the Surplus
Property Board and the disposal agencies.^

It was designed

to avoid uncontrolled dumping and sales to speculators.^
Murray saw the law as a way to avoid the establishment of
government owned Army and Navy stores which he thought had
been an undesirable nuisance after World War I.^
'

V. 0. Key, Jr. wrote that "In terms of enduring effect

on the economy the disposal of government surplus plants,
machinery and other property was probably the most significant
element in reconversion , . . the groups concerned manifested
a most earnest and devoted attention to the development of
public policy on surplus property."

The decision that the

^U. S., Congress, CongressidhaT Digest, December, 1944,
p. 294.
^Surplus Property Disposal Act. Public Law 457, Octo
ber 3, 1944.
5u. S., Congress, Senate,' Surplus Property Report,' dp. cit.
^Key, "Reconversion Phase," p. 1148.
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government was to dispose of the property Ce^cept in some
instances where the government would lease plants) was made,
according to Key, during the summer of 1944.^
questions of:

The important

when? and to whom? remained, and it was these

questions that Murray and others began to study.
The Surplus Property Disposal Act provided that certain
specific preferences were to be a part of any regulation that
the Surplus Property Board would write:

the federal govern

ment was to have priority over all others in acquiring surplus
property--this would facilitate the transfer of surplus propO
erty from one government agency to another.
After the fed
eral government the state and local governments and non
profit institutions were to have priority in purchasing sur
plus property.

In the case of certain classes of property

the former owners were to have re-purchase priority rights.®
Veterans were to have prescribed regulatory advantage in
obtaining surplus property "to establish and maintain their
own small business, professional or agricultural enterprises."
And, as with contract termination, the Smaller War Plants Cor
poration was legally obligated to aid small businessmen in
^Surplus Property Disposal Act, Public Law 457, Octo
ber 3, 1944. SectTorTTz Ca}.
^Ibid., Section 13,
^Ibid,, Section 23«
^°Ibid,. Section 17,
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acquiring surplus property.
This question of priorities was o£ particular interest
to Murray.

He claimed to have been "instrumental in obtain

ing inclusion in the Surplus Property Act of the section
which requires that surplus property be sold Or disposed to
public health institutions under a priority system.
Though the legislation did provide for such a priority in
that disposals were to take place in such a way that non
profit institutions were to be given "an opportunity to ful
fill, in the public interest their legitimate needs," it also
called for "good recovery to governmentThus the law
contained conflicting objectives.

It was such conflicts

within the new legislation that led some, including President
1A

Roosevelt, to consider it awkward. ^

*

After the new legislation went into effect Murray,
realizing the conflict in objectives, sought more liberal
policies in its administration which would permit public
health and educational institutions "to obtain surplus prop
erty at nominal prices or prices to include only the cost of
care, handling and transportation."^^

When the War Assets

IJ-Ibid. , Section 18.
l^Letter from Murray to S. W, McCullum, May 3, 1946,
Murray Papers.
Surplus Property Disposal Act. Section 13 Cc), and
2.

^^P.M. CNew" York City), November 13, 1944.
ISLetter from Murray to Frank W. Wiley, Director, Mon
tana Aeronautics Commission, April 8, 1946, Murray Papers.
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Administration announced that it had a plan to provide a
95 per cent discount from the fair value of surplus goods
(not in excess of three thousand dollars) sold to public
health and educational institutions, and that when the
items exceeded three thousand dollars then the 95 per cent
discount might still be allowed subject to the discretion
of the War Assets Administrator, Murray announced his whole
hearted approval as he had been urging the War Assets Admin
istrator to take such a step "for many months.It should
be noted that earlier Murray drafted a bill which would have
made surplus property available to educational institutions
free of any charge.

Murray again identified special interest

groups as the opposition-- it was the dealers in supplies to
schools who had protested the measure and prevented in from
carrying.^^

Although Murray believed he had made a contribu

tion toward guiding administrative policy in the direction of
aiding educational and charitable institutions, in March of
1946 he described the act as a failure insofar as veterans
were concerned; he held that it had not provided the assis
tance to the veteran which was justified.^®
S., Congress, Senate, Senate Small Business Com
mittee Release, May 29, 1946,
^^Letter from Murray to Wilda jFullerton, Struthers,
Ohio, December 6, 1944, Murray Papers,
l^Letter from Murray to John L, Cossitt, Decker, Mon
tana, March 9, 1946, Murray Papers,
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Like the contract settlement legislation the Surplus
Property Disposal Act reflected a special concern for small
business.

It called upon the Small War Plants Corporation

to cooperate with the Surplus Property Board towards the
ends of:

purchasing property for resale to small busi

nesses; guaranteeing loans to small businesses in connection
with the acquisition of surplus; conferring with small busi
ness to determine its needs and presenting information to
\
ng
the agencies and to the business world.
In order to help
prevent monopolies the law also contained a section requiring
that the Attorney General be notified of any disposition over
one million dollars.2 0

Murray favored all these provisions

just as he did for contract termination and was an influential
force in their becoming public policy.
Murray would have liked to have included a policy of
congressional oversight of the administration of the surplus
property legislation even stronger than the policy set forth
in the contract termination bill, but this was not to be.
In a report Murray issued on August 22, 1944, he recommended
a section which would have provided that two members of each
house of Congress should attend Surplus Property Board meet
ings and report to their respective houses on the proceedSurplus Property Disposal Act, Section 18.
2 0lbid., Section 20,

21Various speeches by Murray, Murray Papers.
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ings.22

The War Contract Settlement Act called for periodic

reports on the new agencies created by Congress, but it did
not go so far as to establish congressional representation
at agency meetings.

The Surplus Property Disposal Act as

originally passed by the Senate did include such a provision,
and Murray favored it because he believed it would help
restore to Congress its rightful post-war powers.2

Such

a Congressional "sit-in" right was not, however, contained
in the final statutes, having been eliminated in a later
stage of the law-making process, probably on the grounds
that it would have meant burdensome and intolerable meedling
in the bureaucratic process.

It was likely believed that it

would have been a waste of time for congressmen to attend
board meetings, and that the goal of keeping track of execu/

tive and administrative activity could be accomplished in a
more practical manner.

Still the concept of surveillance

was made explicit in the act in a section requiring reports
to Congress explaining how the administration of the law was
consistent with the spirit.
Other administrative problems involving surplus property
disposal gained Murray's attention.
One of these problem areas involved the men President
Roosevelt had appointed to administer disposal.

Many liberals

22u. S,, Congress, Senate, Surplus Property Report,
No, 16, 78th Congress, 2nd Sess,, August ZZ, 1944.
^^Speech by Murray, undated, Murray Papers,
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found the Roosevelt appointees ideologically unacceptable.
Some Congressional observers had decided that when the
Senate Military Affairs Committee decided that a board should
replace the single head who had been in charge of the Surplus
Property Administration it was, more than anything, an attempt
to get rid of William L. Clayton, a man they considered some
what unenlightened and reactionary.

This negative attitude,

which Capitol Hill observers believed the committee members
harbored towards Clayton, was expressed opeilly by people
like James G. Patton, president of the National Farmers Union,
who issued a statement calling for Roosevelt to remove Clayton
on the grounds of his "demonstrated hostility to the true
interests of farmers, of small businessmen, and of labor.
Since Murray and Patton possessed similar liberal ideologies,
as evidenced by their close working relationship on legisla
tion like the Employment Act of 1946, it is safe to assume
Murray held no great love for Clayton's policies.

Whatever

the reasons for the Committee's opting for a board it would
not have been smart politics to say that it was being done
to get rid of Clayton and his policies.More support would
be forthcoming if the decision could be justified on grounds
less ideological, which is the course the senators took.
They said that the job would involve too much power for any
24^ew York Times, August 19,1944.
^^Bailey, pp. 21-^23,
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one inan--making the question one o£ power per se rather than
one of any particular goals of power.2 6
The problem did not end here-^-Roosevelt appointed
Clayton to the new board as well.

Doubly disturbing to

some of the liberals was the appointment of Jesse H. Jones
to the board, a man who, in Patton's opinion, was like
Clayton in that he disliked the "provisions which aid small
business and co-operatives."

Their appointments to the

three-man board was a circumstance which Patton saw as
"very disturbing for every liberal who worked for the re
election of Roosevelt."

Trying to demonstrate their big

business interests Patton derisively referred to the Roose
velt appointees as the "tycoon of Te:xas" and the "world's
largest cotton factor,"7 7

Murray had sought various avenues

to mitigate big business domination including advisory com
mittees of various economic interests in society (labor,
farm, small business, big business, etc.) to the reconversion
programs.28
Murray had, of course, been cognizant of Montana's
particular economic difficulties during World War II.

The

war boom had brought somewhat of a reverse effect upon the
state.

As the war began unskilled workers had left Montana,

^^New York Times, August 19, 1944.

^

^^P.M. CNew York City], November 13, 1944.
S,, Congress, Senate,' Surplus Property Report. No.
1057, 78th Congress, 2nd Sess., August 22, 1944,
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which had no sizable war industry, to go to the west coast
and other parts of the nation to work in war plants.

Murray

catalogued some of the problems which made Montana's situation
more critical economically than most other states:

"high

labor costs, high fuel costs, high transportation costs,
greater distance between cities, no large towns, a loss of
18 per cent of the population in the past three years because
of no war industries in the state, weather fourteen degrees
below zero on the fourteenth of March, 1944, all of these
make a difference.
In light of these special economic difficulties it
was important that Murray try to secure for Montana the ut
most benefit in post-war programs like Surplus Property
Disposal.

Such programs would have to operate at an accel

erated tempo if people were to be brought back into Montana
and a viable post-war economy attained.

In this area,

especially in regard to surplus property, Murray seems
to have performed well.

On January 30, 1947, he was able

to claim:
I have held a series of conferences here
in Washington with top-ranking WAA officials,
and I have finally been successful in persuad
ing them that instead of reducing services and
facilities of the WAA in Montana, they should
be kept as at present in order that our
OQ

^^Statement by Murray regarding the Office of Price
Administration, undated, Murray Papers.
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veterans and small businessmen may have every
opportunity to purchase surplus property items
critically needed to conduct their business
and farming operations in the state. . , .
Colonel Rutten C6th Zone Administrator) had
been most co-operative and he is acting
promptly to dispatch surplus property into
Montana for disposal to veterans and small
businessmen there. I am highly gratified
by the success of our mutual efforts to'main
tain, and, if possible, expand the WAA dis
posal program in our state,
It seems fair to say that of the three areas of reconversion
covered in this study Murray's work in surplus property had
the most benefit for Montanans, certainly the most!immediate
benefit.

30press Release, January 30, 1947, Murray Papers.
WAA - War Assets Administration,

CHAPTER IV
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
With the question of unemployment compensation one
moves clearly over to the "human side" o£ reconversion.
Although liberals like Murray had inserted provisions into
the War Contract Settlement Act and Surplus Property Disposal
Act which served to benefit the interests of small business
men, charitable and educational institutions, against those
big business interests which they saw as opposing their work,
it is in the battle for extending the New Deal in the form
of increased unemployment compensation and the instituting
of national health insurance that the more volatile contro
versies occurred.

Murray viewed the War Contract Settlement

Act and the Surplus Property Disposal Act as "purely transi
tory measures--yes, important transition measures, but
nothing more,"^

Murray^s position, as he stated in August

of 1944, was that Congress had already taken action to aid
business:

"our corporations are to be repaid their previous

two years of tax payments at the rate of eighty-one cents on
every dollar of loss;" and had enacted legislation to aid the
^James Murray, "A Practical Approach," American Polit
ical Science Review, XXXIX, No. 6 CDecember, 1945), p. 1122.
51

52

farmer.

Now, he believed, it was important to act to aid

the unemployed.

He argued that if Congress would enact

legislation to strengthen unemployment compensation it would
be put to productive use, whereas these other benefits which
Congress had decided to bestow might not be.
This chapter will not deal with the Employment Act of
1946 which, although closely related to the question of
increasing state unemployment compensation with a federal
supplement, is a separate and later issue; and one which
went far beyond the scope of reconversion.

Nor will it be

concerned with the Murray-Wagner-Dingell Bill which was de
signed to establish, among other things, a federal system
of medical and hospitalization benefits.

Though a very

interesting legislative effort it too was not intended as
a reconversion measure--in fact opponents of the measure
saw it as an attempt to establish a "cradle-to-the-grave"
welfare system like the British Beveridge Plan.

Also it

might be mentioned that Murray claimed little involvement
in the formulation of the Murray-Wagner-Dingell Bill refer
ring to Robert Wagner (Democrat-New York) as its author.^
^Address by Murray in the U. S. Senate, August 9,
1944, Murray Papers.
^U. S., Congress, Congressional Digest, December, 1944,
p. 297. Murray-Wagner-Dingell Bill, Senate Resolution 1161,
House Resolution 2961, 1944.
^P.M. (New York City), January 14, 1944-
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Unlike the previous two chapters this one is largely
a study of failure--the failure of Murray and his liberal
colleagues to win the support of the majority and their
fellow Congressmen,

Since this chapter does deal with a

more controversial issue than the other two that have been
examined it will also be characterized by arguments of a
more deceptive nature--what Murray favored, and what his
opponents wanted to make it appear he favored, frequently
appear as two different'commodities.
In the second chapter, it was explained how the plan
to have one comprehensive measure covering all of the recon
version problems fell through for diverse reasons.^

Since

this was the case the question of further federal provision
for the demobilized war worker was one of those problems
which had to be approached individually.

Toward this end

Harley M. Kilgore C^emocrat-West Virginia) and Murray were
among the Congressmen who offered bills.^

Rather than analyz

ing the bills in terms of their progress in the law-making
process the emphasis here will be on their substantive con
tent and the highly opinionated positions which were taken
both pro and con.
When the Social Security Act was amended on October 3,
^Supra., p, 18.
^U. S,, Congress, Congressional Digest, December, 1944,
p. 291.

54

1944 with the signing into law o£ the War Mobilization and
Reconversion Act

known as the "George Bill") part of

the national program it created involved placing additional
responsibilities upon the executive to provide re-training
and re-employment.^

The law also guaranteed the solvency

of state unemployment benefit funds in the event that the
stress of reconversion should place a great burden on those
O
funds.
Though these changes had definite appeal to the
liberal "bloc" in Congress that group still saw a need for
greater federal initiative in meeting the unemployment
problems of reconversion.

President Roosevelt, in signing

the bill, expressed some of this concern when he listed what
he considered crucial omissions.

Roosevelt issued a state

ment containing three inadequacies which he felt should be
covered by further legislation:

unemployment compensation

should be provided for federal employees; travel pay should
be provided for discharged workers to their homes or new jobs;
and minimum unemployment compensation standards should be
established.

There had been a battle to include all three

of these positions in the War Mobilization and Reconversion
Act but all three had been thrown out:

the original version

passed by the Senate contained provisions for extending
unemployment compensation to federal employees and for paying
^Social Security Act, Public Law 458. October 3, 1944,
Title III.
^Ibid., Titles IV and XIII.
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transportation costs for federal workers to their homes or
new jobs, but these sections were deleted by the House;
minimum standards to be paid by state agencies were defeated
by both the Senate and House,^

Murray, functioning in his

familiar role as a leader of the liberal forces, had offered
an amendment to the War Mobilization and Reconversion Act
which would have established federal standards for unemploy
ment compensation if it had won acceptance.

Directing a

threat toward those interests which he was convinced were
opposing his efforts, Murray suggested that if the liberal
reforms were not passed by Congress then perhaps it was time
to eliminate some of the post-war legislation to aid cor
porate interests.
Losing the fight for many of the measures which they
would have liked to have seen in the War Mobilization and
Reconversion Act, Murray and other liberals did not give up.
Among the bills which they later introduced was Senate Resolu
tion 1274.

Sponsored by Murray this was a bill to amend the

War Mobilization and Reconversion Act in order to meet those
same needs for which Roosevelt felt the original law should
have provided.

It called for federal funds to be used to

supplement unemployment compensation which was payable under
^U. S., Congress, Congressional Digest, December, 1944,
p. 295.
^^Address by Murray in the U. S, Senate, August 9, 1944,
Murray Papers.
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state laws, unemployment compensation for federal workers,
and transportation allowances for war workers.

Had the

amendment been passed it would have been in effect from
the fifth Sunday after enactment until June 30, 1947.^^
Although Murray was at the time accused of favoring
legislation which would have federalized the system of
unemployment compensation, he argued that Senate Resolution
1274 was an emergency measure to meet an emergency situation
brought about by the war.

The chief objective was to improve

what its proponents saw as inadequate and unequal state pay
ments.

The liberals, fearing extensive unemployment follow

ing the war, reasoned that since the war was a national effort
the federal government must take the responsibility of pro
tecting individuals discontinuing war work.^^

Murray con

sidered the cost of such human aspects of reconversion to be
just as legitimate a cost of war as any other undertaken by
the federal government.
H A s established under the Social Security Act of 1935

unemployment compensation was supported by a payroll tax of
3 per cent which was being turned back over to the states to
be administered by them
the federal administrative
expenses). Social Security Act, Public Law 271, August 14,
Title III.
12u. S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, Septem
ber 19, 1945, p. 8812; Congressional Digest, December, 1944,
p. 291.
S., Congr ess. Senate. Emergency Unemployment Com
pensation. Report No. 565 from the Committee on Finance
pursuant to Senate Resolution 1274, Mr. George, Chairman, 79th
Congress, 1st Sess., p. 2. (Hereafter referred to as Unemploy
ment Compensation. Report No. 565.)
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As originally presented the amendment contained a
"mandatory provision" whereby individuals were to receive
a twenty-five dollar a week maximum benefit from the state,
or if the state chose not to enter into an agreement with
the federal government in order to receive the federal
funds (as was to be the right of the states), then the
additional supplement could go directly to the individual
recipient from the Director of War Management and Recon
version.

Benefits would still have been related to an

individual's prior earnings and the only intended change
was to give recognition to the low ceilings which some states
had set.^^

What this would have meant was that the federal

government would enter into the administration of increased
benefits only if the states did not choose to participate
and handle the administration themselves.

It was in regard

to this "mandatory-provision" that some interesting legal
arguments were presented, legal arguments which the Senate
Finance Committee gave as their reason for deleting the
provision from the amendment.
This legal quagmire developed when the Finance Committee
contacted state officials in order to get their legal opin
ions regarding the ability of the states to participate in the
effort to establish the twenty-five dollar weekly maximum
^^Press release of Senator Kilgore on Emergency Recon
version Unemployment Bill, introduced jointly by Murray,
Wagner (N.Y.), Thomas (Utah), Guffey (Penn.), and Pepper
(Florida), July 17, 1945, Murray Papers,
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benefit payment, either through voluntary agreement or through
direct payment by the Director of War Mobilization and Recon
version.

The replies ran strongly to the negative:

of the

states replying twenty reported they could not enter into
such an agreement without the consent of the state legisla
tures (obtaining the permission of the state legislature
would, in many cases, have entailed special problems such
as the calling of special sessions), seven expressed doubt
that they could, while seventeen said they could.

A second

and related question must have proven just as disillusioning
to the supporters of the amendment:

Regarding the proposal

that direct payments be made by the Director to the unemployed,
thirty-five states, speaking through their governors or
attorney generals, asserted that such an arrangement would
disqualify workers from state benefits, seven said it would
not, and the balance failed to reply.

The Finance Committee,

under Senator George's chairmanship, accepted the testimony
from the states at face value and rejected the "mandatory
provision," reaching the conclusion that "State laws, in
the last analysis, must be interpreted by state officials
and state courts.
15u. S. Senate, Unemployment Compensation, Report No.
565. Among those states wnich asserted that payments would
have to be reduced were Montana, the home state of co-sponsor
Murray, West Virginia, the home state of co-sponsor Kilgore,
and Missouri, the home state of another strong supporter of
the amendment former senator and now President Truman I
Los Angeles Times, September 6, 1945.
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Supporters of the amendment were naturally unable to
accept the conclusion which the Finance Committee reached.
Some, like the younger La Follette (Progressive-Wisconsin),
felt that the opinions which the states had rendered were
only those of entrenched interests seeking to preserve the
status quo and that the best course which Congress could
take would be simply to ignore them.

He asked Congress

. . are we interested in what is the opinion of the
governor's of the forty-eight states, or are we interested
in the plight of the unemployed?"

Additional remarks by

La Follette indicate that he had concluded that since the
unemployment of reconversion was a national problem it was
up to Congress to initiate programs to ameliorate its effect
and to forget about what the states might think.
Others had a more sophisticated legal answer to the
states' claims that they could not participate.

The minority

opinion of the Committee on Finance, written by Joseph H.
Guffey (Democrat-Pennsylvania), cited the legal opinion of
the Social Security Board which found that provisions of
all the state laws relating to the question were practically
identical, and that these laws were not written with the
intent of preventing supplemental payments, but rather to
prevent duplicate payments.

The Social Security Board

S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, Septem
ber 20, 1945, p. 8964.
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concluded that, as a rule, the states did have the legal
authority to participate in the program called for by
Senate Resolution 1274.

The minority position saw a dan

gerous precedent in the Finance Committee's decision to
omit the supplemental payments provision on the basis of
the assertion of those states which said they had no legal
authority to participate--it was feared that no matter what
the provisions of a Congressional proposal might be that
the states could kill it simply by denying that they could
legally participate.

Guffey further argued that Congress

must do what it could to provide all possible benefit to
those states which said they could participate.

If Congress

implemented the program in those states which wanted it, then
the states which gave adverse opinions would be allowed to
review those opinions, and, in the event of a change of
attitude, opt for participation in the program, calling
special sessions of their legislatures if necessary to rid
themselves of what Guffey termed "self-inflicted difficul
ties."^''

A minority report often represents fundamental dis

agreement, and these legal arguments were structured to defend
the interests involved; so it is to the social arguments which
were made that one must turn to gain a deeper understanding
S., Congress, Senate. Emergency Unemployment Compensation. Report No. 565, No. 2, Senate Minority views of Mr.
Guttey from the Committee on Finance pursuant to S. 1274, 79th
Congress, 1st Sess. (Hereinafter referred to as Unemployment
Compensation, Report No, 565, No. 2.).
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of the issue.
Just how much unemployment was to be expected?

The

figures differed with the sources and quite naturally those
who favored increasing federal assistance cited much higher
figures:

Labor officials and'representatives of the execu

tive branch testified before the House Ways and Means Com
mittee and the Senate Finance Committee during the last week
of April, 1945 that unemployment might reach eight million by
the next spring before gradually reconverting industry would
lessen the situation.1 °fi The War Manpower Commission estimated
that unemployment might reach seven and a half million during
the year after V-J day.^^

Such estimates certainly provided

data to support measures like the administration supported
Murray-Kilgore Bill.

Local situations also indicated serious

increases in unemployment-- in Murray's home state the Great
Falls Tribune stated on December 17, 1945 that the number of
unemployment claims had doubled in the previous two months
and that local officials speculated that the increase was
caused by war workers who were migrating back home after hav
ing left Montana to work in war production centers.
Those who were opposed to emergency measures like the
Murray-Kilgore Bill had their own interpretations of the
^^washington Post, September 5, 1945.
S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, July 17,
1945, p. 7715.
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unemployment situation.

The Wall Street Journal editorialized

that the need for supplementary provisions "as an emergency
measure is not at all clear."

The states, the newspaper sug

gested, could likely handle any unemployment problems if
Congress and executive agencies would concentrate their efforts
on industrial reconversion,In another issue the editor
stated that although the nation may have millions unemployed
there were hundreds of thousands of jobs "going begging" and
that already existing systems of unemployment compensation
were, in part, responsible for these jobs being unfilled.
The Washington Post saw no need for increased unemployment
compensation because of a number of economic factors which
would contribute to post-war economic prosperity, including
low money rates, increased agricultural production, increased
residential construction, increased railroad business, and
increased demand for civilian goods. 2 2

An economist employed

by the United States Chamber of Commerce in testifying against
the use of federal funds to increase compensation predicted
that "a great boom is pending."

This boom would be the

natural result of unprecedented purchasing power stored up
during the war.

"I am not predicting its indefinite con-

20Editorial, Wall Street Journal, September 12, 1945.

^^Ibid., September 6, 1945.
22Roger W. Babson, "Transition Ahead," Washington Post,
January 1, 1945.
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tinuation, although I think it will continue for several
years:

Unwise reconversion and labor policies could do

much to halt it."^^

Since no one could say for certain

how much post-war unemployment the country would experience
it was difficult to say how badly unemployment compensation
needed federal supplementation--at least insofar as it needed
supplementation as an emergency measure within the recon
version program.
There was also considerable disagreement as to whether
states possessed adequate resources to meet post-war unemploy
ment problems.

Proponents of the Murray-Kilgore Bill (S. 1274)

tended to argue that state funds were inadequate, or that even
if adequate the states would defeat the purpose for which
unemployment compensation was originally established by hoard
ing the funds.Opponents, in turn, would argue that it was
illogical for the federal government to provide supplementary
funds since the national debt had increased during the war
while the states had become more prosperous; and that state
funds were entirely adequate, totalling some five billion
7^
dollars and increasing steadily.This
question was obviously
related to how much unemployment could be expected.
^^Philadelphia Record.

September 5, 1945.

24u. S., Congress, Congressional Digest, December, 1944,
p. 291. U. S., Congress, Senate, Senator Wagner speaking.
Congressional Record, September 19, 1945, p. 8881.
25Editorial. New York Herald Tribune, September 12,
1945. It is, of course, a non-Keynsian and highly dubious
argument to flatly equate a high national debt with financial
weakness. U,S,, Congress, Congressional Digest, December, 1944.
p. 291.

64

How adequate were the state benefits?

Supporters of

the Murray-Kilgore Bill and other similar measures thought
an increase in both the amount and duration of payments was
entirely justified.

The Murray-Kilgore Bill would have

established a $25 dollar per week maximum for a period of
26 weeks.

Kilgore cited the existing benefits as ranging

from $12 to $22 per week and called the situation harmful
in that it allowed "the income of the many to fall too low."^^
Testimony before the Senate Finance Committee indicated that
a quarter of the states had not raised their standards for
ten years. 2 8

By establishing federal standards it was hoped

that gross inequalities would be mitigated--average weekly
earnings in the Territory of Alaska were $93.45 per week in
1944 while the unemployment compensation ceiling was $16;
in California the average weekly earnings were $51.97 and
the ceiling $20.^^

Those who favored the $26 ceiling felt

that the state increases had been very limited in real terms-that payments had not kept up with the inflationary spiral
indicated by the Bureau of Labor statistics showing the cost
of living index in May of 1945 some 28 per cent over the
26washington Post.

September 11, 1945.

S., Congress, Congressional Digest, December,
1944, pp. 301, 303.
28u. S., Senate, Unemployment Compensation. Report No.
565, No. 2.
S., Congress, Senate.
September 19, 1945, p. 8891.

Congressional Record,
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1935-1939 average.

The need was seen as being even more

urgent when it was realized that prices o£ food and cloth
ing which represent a large part o£ the average family's
expense had risen 30 and 44 per cent during the same period.30
Opponents of measures like the Murray-Kilgore Bill
argued that states were taking care of the problem them
selves and federal effort was not required--that forty-five
state legislatures met in 1945 and that twenty-five had in
creased both benefits and the duration of those benefits,
and that thirty-two had increased one or the o t h e r . T h e y
saw each state as being the best judge of its own conditions:
Maryland officials noted that their legislature had rendered
judgment that twenty dollars a week for twenty-six weeks was
right and proper and that additional federal assistance was
not necessary.If the liberals could argue that a federal
supplement was required to keep up with inflation then the
Wall Street Journal would have no trouble arguing against such
a proposal on the grounds that it was inflationary in itself
in that it increased federal spending.33 Inevitably the
S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record,
July 17, 1945, p. 8963.
S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record.
September 20, 1945, p. 8962.
^^Editorial.

Washington Post, September 12, 1945.

^^Editorial.

V/all Street Journal, May 31, 1945.
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argument that increased compensation would foster increased
indolence appeared.

A New York Times editorial read:

It has been pointed out that a benefit of twentyfive dollars a week is equivalent to sixty-three
cents an hour for a forty hour week. In some
states this is certainly going to be considered
a pretty generous sum for not working six months
of the year. The offer of a job, at, say 75 cents
an hour will be regarded by many persons on
unemployment compensation as an offer of only
12 cents an hour for actively working. It may
be less than this, as unemployment compensation
benefits are tax free, while the wages to which
they are related are subject to income tax.^^
Who should be covered by state benefits?

One of the pro

visions which President Roosevelt and Murray believed should
have been in the War Mobilization and Reconversion Act was
that deleted section providing for unemployment compensation
for federal workers.

This is one of the things for which

Murray's amendment (Senate Resolution 1274) would have pro
vided.

As the Social Security System was then functioning

only war workers employed by private concerns engaged in the
execution of government war contracts were eligible to re
ceive unemployment compensation.

Workers in government-owned

plants were not eligible because the federal government was
not, and could not be, taxed in order to contribute to the
fund for unemployment compensation.

Workers in federal agencies

not engaged in war production were in the same situation except
that under Civil Service Regulations they might be able to
^^Editorial.

New York Times, September 20, 1945.
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withdraw some of the funds which they had contributed to the
retirement fund.

Maritime workers were not able to draw

unemployment compensation under the Social Security Act
because it had been decided that it would be impossible to
Tr

administer the system for them.*'^
Senator Wagner said that these categories of uncovered
individuals totalled some three million federal employees
•7

and 150,000 merchant marines.

One of the reasons Murray

favored extending coverage to federal employees during the
reconversion period was because he believed it was the
responsibility of the federal government to aid those who
had engaged in war work.

Had his amendment to the War

Mobilization and Reconversion Act been accepted a trans
portation allowance to help workers relocate to new employ37
ment situations would also have been created.
The prin
cipal objection raised to the transportation allowances was
that it would be impossible to determine who really needed
•Z O
such an allowance and thus prevent abuse of the system.
The final point of conflict was whether the proposed
federal supplement would have meant increased federalization^
S., Congress, Congressional Digest, December, 1944,
p. 295.
^^Ibid., p. 296.
S. Senate, Unemployment Compensation, Report No.
565.
S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record,
September 20, 1945, p. 8962,
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of the program over the long-run even though Murray and
other sponsors had presented it as a temporary emergency
measure.

Murray acknowledged that in seeking an answer

to unequal and often inadequate state benefits it was
difficult to frame "adequate" legislation short of feder
alizing the whole program.Critics of measures like
Senate Resolution 1274 argued that while such legislation
was ostensibly designed to meet an emergency situation if
it did pass, it would as a practical matter mean increased
federal control.

The Washington Post editorialized:

The Kilgore Emergency Unemployment Insurance
Bill, not serviced and strongly supported by
the Administration ... is the forerunner of
radical changes in the country's system of un
employment insurance . . . whatever the bills
several objectives may be, it is undeniably a
first, and a long step toward federalizing our
unemployment insurance. This is an undesirable
and unnecessary step, politically and indus
trially. The states have handled their admin
istrative problems efficiently. The reconver
sion decisions which need to iDe made in the
next three months--and in the next three years-had best be made by officials close to the local
conditions. There is nothing in the record to
support the view that authorities in Washington
are nearly so qualified by experience and respon
sibility, to make these decisions as are the men
on the spot .... There can be no national
standards of benefits that does not lead surely
and swiftly to national standards of wages and
working conditions.^®

39Memo, dated May 3, 1945, Murray Papers.
40Leo Wolman, Editorial, Washington Post, September 7,
1945.
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A New York Times editorial presented the same view:
Mr. Truman insists that this is merely an
emergency program, which will leave unemploy
ment compensation with the states. No one who
knows anything o£ practical politics can ser
iously believe that any state, once having its
benefit payments increased or lengthened,
could on July 1, 1947, in fact return to its
former smaller or shorter benefit payments.
Those who wish a uniform scale of benefits
throughout the country, with the federal
government supplying funds to make it pos
sible, should logically (and many of them do
in fact) prefer an outright federalized
system.41
Though it would seem to this writer that, given the context
of Murray's political outlook, he would have favored feder
alizing the whole program he also realized that the only hope
for increased benefit to the unemployed during the recon
version period was through the adoption of an "emergency"
program.
One of the difficulties which beset the Murray-Kilgore
Bill came in the form of an amendment sponsored by Senator
Lucas (Democrat-Illinois) which would have returned all
employment facilities and personnel of the United States
Employment Service (U.S.E.S.) to the states.

This action

would have been in defiance of President Truman's expressed
wishes to Congressand that it was introduced by Lucas
caught some off-guard since he was considered a strong
^^Editorial, New York Times, September 20, 1945.
^^Editorial, Times-Herald CWashington, D.C.), Septem
ber 19, 1945.
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administration supporter and was on record as favoring
federalization of the whole unemployment program!

The

states had loaned unemployment services to the federal
government early in the war and Truman had specifically
asked Congress to continue this arrangement until June
of 1947 and had further requested that appropriations
to these services be increased due to what he perceived
as an emergency situation.

The Lucas amendment would

have required that with the passage of the Murray-Kilgore
Bill the services of the United States Employment Service
be returned to the states within ninety days.

This was

disconcerting to those members of Congress who thought
unemployment had become a national rather than a state
concern during reconversion.'^^
When the War Contract Settlement Act was passed the
liberal 'bloc' in the Senate had pledged that when Congress
re-convened they would be able to do something about the
"human problems" of reconversion.'^^

Insofar as increasing

unemployment compensation was one of their goals they failed.
This failure was not only a failure for the progressive forces
in the Senate but was the first major legislative defeat of
President Truman who unequivocally favored federal suppleS., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record,
September 17, 1945, p. 8874.
S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record,
September 19, 1945, p. 8888.
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mentation of welfare payments both as President and as a
Senator,^^
Murray was convinced that dismissal wages were not
the answer to the unemployment problems of reconversion-he feared that dismissal wages would discriminate between
d. fi

war workers and others in an unfair manner.

Strengthening

the unemployment compensation system with federal funds was
only a partial answer to unemployment problems, designed as
an emergency measure it would only increase the workers
security for a temporary period,

IVhat Murray envisioned

was an employment act which would guarantee every worker
a job.

He viewed it as a companion bill to increased un

employment compensation.

Here, too, the liberals were to

see a main focus of their effort pass away without gain as
the provision providing for a guarantee of a job was sacri
ficed to the forces of compromise.
^^Thomas Stokes, Editorial, News (Washington, D.C.),
May 31, 1945.
^^Memo, May 3, 1944, Murray Papers.
^^The original version of the Employment Act of 1946,
section 2 (b) read: "All Americans able to work and seeking
work have the right to useful, remunerative, regular and
full-time employment, it is the policy of the United States
to assure the existence at all times of sufficient employ
ment opportunities to enable all Americans who have finished
their schooling and who do not have full-time housekeeping
responsibilities freely to exercize this right." Bailey,
Appendix A, p. 243.
When Truman signed the bill into law it had been changed
to read, "The Congress hereby declares that it is the con
tinuing policy and responsibility of the Federal government
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Murray and other liberals thought federal action was
necessary to correct the disparity between the payments of
the states and to raise the standards of those payments.
Since only one state had acted towards development an unemploy
ment compensation system prior to the Social Security Act of
1935, why, they asked, should it be expected that the states
would provide adequate benefits?^®

The problems which would

stem from raising benefits through federal legislation without
federalizing the entire program were also clear to Murray.
He realized how difficult it would be politically for the
states to lower benefits once they had been significantly
raised.

to use all practicable means ... to foster and promote
free competitive enterprise and the general welfare, condi
tions under which there will be afforded useful employment,
for those able, willing, and seeking to work, and to promote
maximum employment, production and purchasing power."
Bailey, p. 228,
48u. S.. Senate, Unemployment Compensation, Report No.
565, No. 2.

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
John Snyder, Director of War Management and Reconver
sion, stated in an October 1, 1945 report to Congress that
"There can be no doubt that thorough preparation by both
business and Government has saved us months o£ time and
billions of dollars; it will reduce the amount of unemploy
ment."^

There can also be no doubt as to the significant

role James Murray played in this success.

It is also true

that Murray and other liberals failed to achieve some of
the goals which they thought should have been a part of
reconversion policy.

Of the three areas with which Murray

was most concerned it seems clear that he and other liberals
were usually successful in shaping policy the way they de
sired in war contract termination and surplus property dis
posal; however, these were matters on which there existed
widespread consensus on what policy should be established.
This is to say that although Murray was influential in develop
ing policy in these areas, the policy that he did help to
develop was not radically different from what someone more
lU. S. Office of War Management and Reconversion, Pro
duction Jobs, Market, 4th Report to the President, the Senate
and House o± Representatives by the Director of 0. W. M. and
R. John Snyder, October 1, 1945.
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to the right of the political spectrum would have presented
had he been in Murray's position.

In regard to increasing

unemployment compensation with federal funds, an issue which
was considerably more controversial, the failure of the
liberals seems equally clear.
There were a number of perspectives from which Murray
viewed reconversion:

He saw it as a struggle between the

interests of big business vs. small business and labor.

He

repeatedly voiced fears that "special interest groups,"
which he most often equated with big business, would influ
ence adjustment policy unfairly in their favor.

He betrayed

a deep suspicion of what has come to be known as the "military
mind" and its influence on public policy.

With Murray one

sees an individual interested in a continuation of the New
Deal political philosophy into the post-war world.

One fre

quently sees a legislator limited by the "system"--of a very
liberal ideology straining at the limits of tradition, at the
limits of what public opinion will tolerate.
Compromise is endemic to the American political process
but it seems to have been demonstrated in a particularly graphic
manner in Murray's case as he worked hard for a temporary fed
eral supplement to unemployment compensation while really
favoring complete federalization of the entire program; as
he eliminated unemployment compensation from the War Contract
Settlement Act because he realized it was the only way it could
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be passed even though he favored an omnibus reconversion bill
which would have attacked all the problems; as he helped to
produce the type of legislation needed to keep the economy in
high gear, and yet was largely stymied in his- efforts to
create that "human side" of reconversion which he felt was
more important.

Murray would have liked to have seen govern

ment planning on a much larger scale but he realized that the
public was not yet prepared to accept such extensive planning.
In Murray^s opinion the pendulum of executive-legislative
power had swung too far towards the executive during the war
years and the problems of reconversion were something that
Congress should have the final say on in order that the leg
islative branch might regain its proper law-making function.
In some part this increased Congressional initiative stemmed
from executive failures --Murray did not want a repeat of the
chaos which accompanied the World War I experience when the
executive branch controlled reconversion, and he did not favor
some of the principles and priorities which he thought an all
too business-oriented executive apparatus was utilizing in the
termination of World War II contracts.

Senate war-time sub

committees like those of Murray and Truman did a good deal to
point up these executive inadequacies.
Much of the controversy which has surrounded the proper
balance between legislative and executive power of administration
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stems from ambiguities within the Constitution.^

The type of

Congressional surveillance of the executive that appeared in
the War Contract Settlement Act became the stated legal re
sponsibility of all committees with the Legislative Reorganiza
tion Act of 1946:
To assist Congress in appraising the admin
istration of the laws . . . each standing com
mittee of the Senate and House of Representatives
shall exercize continuous watchfulness of the
execution by the administrative agencies con
cerned of any laws, the subject matter of which
is within the jurisdiction of such committee.^
Essentially what Murray wanted to see was that same respon
sible Congress which Woodrow Wilson had argued for in Congres
sional Government:
If the people could have, through Congress,
daily knowledge of all the more important
transactions of the government offices, an
insight into all that now seems withheld and
private, their confidence in the executive,
now so often shaken, would, I think be very
soon established.
Unless Congress have and use every means
of acquainting itself with acts and the dis
position of the administrative agents of the
government, the country must be helpless to
learn how it is being served; and unless
Congress both scrutinize these things and
sift them by every form of discussion, the
country must remain in embarrassing, crip
pling ignorance of the very affairs which
it is most important that it understand and
^See David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p"! 404.
^Quoted in William L. Morrow, Congressional Government
(New York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1969), p. 189.
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direct.^
The importance of reconversion had become very clear
to the public in the presidential campaign of 1944, and it
continued to be an issue through 1952 when Eisenhower claimed
that the Korean situation had, in part, been caused by Truman's
demobilizing too fast.^

(The criticism loses some of its power

when it is remembered that the Republican candidate in 1948,
Thomas Dewey, had suggested that demobilization was not taking
place fast enough.)^

Although reconversion remained an issue

through the 1952 election its importance had dwindled:

Robert

E. Lane believes it to be clear that the reason the 1944
election was seen as a much more important contest than the
1952 election is because people were so concerned about economic questions which hinged upon reconversion issues.7 The
''^Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1900)^ pp. 299, 303.
^A. J. Muller, Adlai Stevenson: A Study in Values (New
York: Harper and Row, 1967), pT 110.
^Ibid.. p. 111. This is not to say that Eisenhower's
statement is completely invalidated by Dewey's earlier remarks-Eisenhower's remarks must stand on their own merit--rather it
means that there was a loss of power in terms of the validity
of the statement as an attack on the Democrats. (The intent
here is to note a logical contradiction, and not to make any
sort of assertion about a real loss of political power which
may, or may not have occurred — it is not known how many of the
voters in 1952 were aware of Dewey^s remarks of four years
earlier, or how they logically related the two statements if
they were aware of them.)
^Robert E. Lane, "The Politics of Consensus in an Age
of Affluence" in Political Man (New York: Free Press, 1972),
pp. 228-229. "The implication is clear: people were carrying
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importance of reconversion is further emphasized by Harold
Stein's observation that in 1944 "practically all the chief
participants in the reconversion controversy were mentioned,
publically or privately, as Vice-Presidential nominees."®
This list of individuals who were seriously considered included
Truman, who had become recognized as a very effective Senator
through his role as Chairman of the Special Senate Committee
to Investigate War Management and Reconversion.

It seems

reasonable to assume that Murray would have received some
consideration for the Vice-Presidency had he not been ineli
gible under the Constitution, having been born in Canada and
into the 1944 election--when postwar reconversion anxieties
loomed-- their sense of partisan alarm learned in the 1930's.
In 1952, with the war in the Far East still unresolved, and the
cold war in full swing, the sense that the country's welfare
hinged on the election nevertheless dwindled drastically."
The following table is used by Lane to summarize the data
he has collected from several sources regarding this question
of voter perception of the importance of the elections of
1944 and 1952:
1944
1952
October
November
Very important to the country:
54
21
20
Country will be better off:
34
40
42
Some difference; it depends:
Won't make much difference;
no difference:
9
32
.
Lane seems right in stressing the importance of economic
anxiety in making the election of 1944 one of such great con
cern. However, if further data were available in the form of
questions which separated the economic from other possible in
fluences in making the election of 1944 one of greater concern
then Lane's case would be a stronger one. Was not World War II
a source of greater concern to the average American than the
Korean War? Can it be assumed that the only criteria that the
voters judge presidential candidates by is their position on
economic issues? In over-stating his argument Lane seems to be
sweeping other sources of public concern under the rug.
®Stein, Public Administration and Public Policy, p. 247.
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become a United States citizen through naturalization.^
Murray's work in reconversion should be considered a
very important part of his career in the Senate (1935-1961).
Murray was the most important figure in Congress insofar as
reconversion policy is concerned.
one of mixed results.

His record, however, was

His ability to shape policy about which

basic consensus prevailed testifies to the significant posi
tion which he occupied in the Senate; just as the rejection
of measures which provided for federal supplementation of
unemployment compensation seems to signal an indication of
a failure to induce Congress to take certain steps which
Murray and other liberals regarded as important in terms of
promoting social justice during the reconversion period.

9Who*s Who in America. 1944-45, Volume XXIII (Chicago:
Marquis Publications, 1945).
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